Lint Center Launches Partnership with NCSA to Advance Intelligence Education

New Partnership Establishes Free Memberships to the National Cybersecurity Student Association for Scholarship Recipients and a Media Partnership.

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, a non-profit dedicated to fostering the educational development of the next generation of America’s Counterintelligence and National Security Workers, announced a new partnership with the National Cybersecurity Student Association. The NCSA, a leading organization supporting cybersecurity educational programs, plans to work with the Lint Center to further their shared missions of providing educational opportunities for emerging leaders in the national security and intelligence fields.

The NCSA will be providing the Lint Center’s scholarship recipients with free membership to the National Cybersecurity Student Association beginning in July 2016. The free NCSA membership will provide an abundance of resources to the Lint Center’s merit-based scholarship winners. Resources from the NCSA include a consortium of higher education institutions, businesses, and government agencies focused on collaborative efforts to advance Information Security education/research and strengthen the national cybersecurity workforce which was funded under a National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant.

“The National Cybersecurity Student Association (NCSA) is excited to partner with The Lint Center for National Security Studies, Inc. in order to energize, expand and cultivate a diverse ecosystem of next generation cybersecurity professionals through education, mentoring, and professional development opportunities” said  Gustavo Hinojosa, Executive Director of NCSA.

In addition to the free membership, NCSA and the Lint Center will collaborate on a new media partnership focused on the promotion of education in the fields of national security and intelligence.

“Having watched the beginning of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), I understand the need for NCSA” said James R. Lint, CEO at the Lint Center. “It is great to get students involved in understanding cyber threats and cyber espionage early. It will be a great future force multiplier for the Cyber fight.”

 

This press release was prepared by Lint Center volunteer, Jake Goldberg.

 

About the National Cybersecurity Student Association:

The National Cybersecurity Student Association www.cyberstudents.org , is open to all college and university students, 18 years of age and older interested in Cybersecurity Education and Careers.  It is a one-stop-shop to enhance the educational and professional development of cybersecurity students through activities, networking and collaboration.  The Association helps students connect the dots thru their education to careers, with connections, collaborations and career support.  Our group supports the cybersecurity educational programs of academic institutions, inspires career awareness and encourages creative efforts to increase the number of underrepresented populations in the field.  Our Student members are looking for internships, scholarships and career opportunities.

NCSA Marketing Flyer

About the Lint Center:

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, Inc., founded in 2007, is a non-profit IRS 501 (c) (3) organization created to award merit-based scholarships biannually for Counterintelligence and National Security Workers, their children and scholars, and to advance the study of National Security, cross-cultural studies, and global understanding. The Center, an IRS approved charity, is veteran and minority operated and managed. For more information, please visit www.LintCenter.org.

World War I Counterintelligence Agents Get Their Man – February 1918

Published with Permission by:
Lori S. Tagg, Command Historian,
US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

On August 13, 1917, the US Army’s Military Intelligence Section (later elevated to Division) created the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) to protect American forces in France from sabotage and subversion. CIP agents also conducted special investigations, including suspected German espionage activities, throughout the United States.  The CIP had difficulty apprehending the enemy agents involved because they often fled to Mexico.  Several CIP agents were stationed along the US-Mexico border during this period to investigate and apprehend suspected German spies.

Two CIP agents in Nogales, Arizona, Captains Joel A. Lipscomb and Byron S. Butcher, recruited Dr. Paul B. Altendorf to infiltrate German spy rings in Mexico.  Altendorf was an Austrian immigrant to Mexico, where he served as a Colonel in the Mexican army.  Known to the CIP as Operative A-1, Altendorf managed to join the German Secret Service and become linked with several other German spies living in Mexico.

In January 1918, the CIP learned that Altendorf was accompanying one Lothar Witzke from Mexico City to the US border.  Witzke was a 22-year-old former lieutenant in the Germany navy, who alternately went by Harry Waberski, Hugo Olson, and Pablo Davis, to name just a few of his many aliases.  He had long been under CIP surveillance as a suspected German spy and saboteur.  During the trip from Mexico City, Witzke had no suspicion that his companion was an Allied double agent taking note of Witzke’s every move and indiscretion.  At one point, a drunk Witzke let slip bits of information that Altendorf quickly passed on to Capt. Butcher.  Specifically, Altendorf informed the CIP that Witzke’s handlers had sent him back to the US to incite mutiny within the US Army and various labor unions, conduct sabotage, and assassinate American officials.

On or about February 1, 1918, Capt. Butcher apprehended Witzke once he crossed the border at Nogales, and a search of Witzke’s luggage revealed a coded letter and Russian passport. Capt. John Manley, assistant to Herbert Yardley in the Military Intelligence Division’s MI-8 Cryptographic Bureau in Washington, DC, deciphered the letter, revealing Witzke’s German connections. The letter stated: “Strictly Secret! The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent.”

While detained at Fort Sam Houston awaiting trial, Witzke was extensively interrogated by CIP agents but refused to provide any details about his contacts, co-conspirators, or alleged espionage.  His trial began in August 1918, and witnesses against him included Dr. Altendorf, Capt. Butcher, Capt. Lipscomb, and Capt. Manley.  Witzke took the stand in his own defense and spun a fantastical tale of how he was simply a down-on-his-luck drifter framed as a German spy.  The Military Commission found Witzke guilty of espionage and sentenced him to death, the only German spy thus sentenced in the US during World War I.  After the war, President Woodrow Wilson commuted his sentence to life in prison, and he was transferred to Fort Leavenworth.  In 1923, however, Witzke was pardoned and released to the German government.

A decade later, during the international Mixed Claims Commission hearings into damages related to the war, several American lawyers revealed Witzke’s role in the sabotage of the Black Tom Island munitions depot in New York Harbor on July 20, 1916. Ostensibly, he had been one of three collaborators who had placed dynamite on several barges loaded with ammunition causing a blast felt as far away as Philadelphia and Maryland.  The explosion lit up the night sky, shattered windows, broke water mains, and peppered the Statue of Liberty with shrapnel.  Seven people were killed.  Although in 1939 the Mixed Claims Commission found Germany complicit in the sabotage, Witzke and his co-conspirators, allegedly responsible for the worst act of terrorism on American soil up to that time, went unpunished.  Additionally, Germany refused to pay the $50 million judgment.

The capture of Witzke and other German spies and saboteurs by the Army’s counterintelligence agents undoubtedly prevented many, but not all, planned sabotage activities during the war.  Such incidents poisoned relations between the US and Germany and introduced suspicions and fear in the minds of the American public.  Americans could no longer assume complete security from enemy acts of terror on US soil, a reminder still valid today.

For more information on the Black Tom Island incident, see Michael Warner’s “The Kaiser Sows Destruction: Protecting the Homeland the First Time Around,” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article02.html#rfn12.

 

Damage to a pier at Black Tom Island caused by German sabotage to prevent American munitions from reaching Germany’s enemies.
(Library of Congress Photo)

Decoded Zimmermann Telegram Sets US on Path to War – January 1917

Published with Permission by:
Lori S. Tagg, Command Historian,
US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

“…we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.”

These words are extracted from the now infamous telegram from Arthur Zimmerman, the German Foreign Secretary, to Heinrich von Eckardt, German Minister to Mexico.  The telegram, sent from Berlin on January 16, 1917, directed Eckardt to propose an alliance between Germany and Mexico to the Mexican president in the event the US formally entered World War I.

World War I, or the Great War as it was then known, had been fomenting in Europe for years, but the final catalyst proved to be the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in June 1914.  Shortly thereafter, Germany declared war successively on Russia, France, Belgium, and Portugal, and the United Kingdom and other European nations quickly declared war on Germany. The war eventually embroiled nations worldwide.  The US steadfastly retained its neutrality for two years. President Woodrow Wilson, re-elected in 1916 on the slogan “He kept us out of war,” resolutely but unsuccessfully pursued a negotiated peace between the two sides.  By early 1917, Germany decided to launch unrestricted U-boat warfare on all ships, neutral or belligerent, in the waters of the war zones. This effort, German planners predicted, would bring England to the brink of economic collapse and thus surrender within months.

Zimmermann knew that the U-boat war would force the US, reluctantly but inexorably, into the war on the side of the Allies.  He believed that if Germany could entice Mexico into a war with the United States, it would divert US attention and ammunition shipments away from the Allies.  On January 18, the telegram reached Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington, DC, who was then to send it to Eckardt in Mexico.  Zimmermann had audaciously sent the message over the US State Department’s own trans-Atlantic cable, which President Wilson had allowed Germany to use for transmitting communications related to peace negotiations.  Inexplicably, Wilson had allowed those dispatches to be sent in the German code, for which the State Department did not have a codebook.

Unbeknownst to the US, British cryptographers had been intercepting message traffic on the State Department’s telegraph route.  In addition, unbeknownst to both the US and the Germans, those same British code-breakers had cracked the German diplomatic code and immediately set themselves to decoding the Zimmermann Telegram.  Incredulous at its contents, the British debated how best to notify the US, knowing, on one hand, it would bring the US into the war and, on the other, that it would anger the US to know England was reading its dispatches.  To prevent the latter, the British code section waited until Bernstorff sent the message to Eckardt and used that message, slightly altered from the original, to enlighten the US of the brazen German scheme.

The British finally revealed the contents of the telegram to the US on February 23, and a week later, major newspapers around the country published the evidence of the German conspiracy.  Americans reacted with a mix of disbelief and anger.  Rumors that Germany had financed Mexican bandit Pancho Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916 had resulted in a comprehensive investigation by the State Department.  The results of that investigation, as well as others into German intrigue in Mexico, were inconclusive, however.  As a result, most Americans initially viewed the telegram as a hoax–surely the Germans were not so foolhardy as to promise to give away part of the United States.

Ultimately, the directives in the Zimmermann Telegram came to naught; the Mexican president chose to remain neutral rather than instigate a war with its northern neighbor.  Undeniably, however, knowledge of the threat of hostile action on American territory shifted public opinion in support of a war most citizens had previously marginalized.  At the same time, Germany had launched the unrestricted submarine warfare it had previously threatened, resulting in the sinking of several US merchant ships in late March.  The Great War, therefore, was no longer just a threat to Europe.  On April 2, 1917, President Wilson requested a declaration of war from Congress, stating, “That [the German government] means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors, the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico is eloquent evidence. We accept this challenge of hostile purpose….”  Congress overwhelmingly voted for war and ultimately, American intervention helped turn the tide in favor of the Allies and end the war.

The Zimmermann Telegram (National Archives)

OPSEC Precautions For This Site

Source: http://news.nationalpost.com/arts/movies/jason-bourne-proves-why-computers-are-the-worst-thing-to-happen-to-the-spy-thriller-since-no-more-day-to-day-formalwear

Things to keep in mind when interacting with The Lint Center, particularly when leaving comments or uploading photos:

  1. Defense conditions are classified secret, while force protection conditions are unclassified.
  2. Vulnerability of oconus installations to sabotage or penetration is classified secret if U.S. Intelligence information is made.
  3. The identity of units planned for deployment is confidential until an official announcement of the deployment is made.
  4. General geographic location of units deployed ( I.E. City, Country or Area) is unclassified.
  5. Specific geographic location of units deployed is confidential.
  6. Details of allied military participation in operations are secret.

The Global reach of the World Wide Web requires special precautions to be taken when posting information. The following types of information will not be posted publicly on WarriorLodge.com and will be taken down immediately:

  • Information that is for official use only (FOUO). This type of information would pose an unacceptable risk to the US Military, especially in electronically aggregated form. While records containing FOUO information will normally be marked at the time of their creation, records that do not bare such markings shall be assumed to contain FOUO information.
  • Analysis and recommendations concerning lessons learned which would reveal sensitive military operations, exercises or vulnerabilities.
  • Reference to unclassified information that would reveal sensitive movements of military assets or the location of units, installations, or personnel where uncertainty regarding location is an element of a military plan or program.
  • Personal information including compilations of names or personnel assigned overseas, sensitive, or routinely deployable units.
  • Names, locations, and specific identifying information about family members of military and government employees.
  • Highly technical information that can be used or be adapted for use to design, engineer, product, manufacture, operate, repair, overhaul, or reproduce any military or space equipment or technology concerning such equipment.
  • Unclassified information pertaining to classified programs. The clearance review procedures for unclassified information pertaining to classified programs proposed for posting to a publicly accessible web sites must take into account the likelihoods of classification compilation.

So, let’s review…

  1. Don’t discuss current or future deployment destinations.
  2. Don’t discuss current or future operations or missions.
  3. Don’t discuss current or future dates and times of when service members will be in deployed, in-port or conducting exercises.
  4. Don’t discuss readiness issues and numbers.
  5. Don’t discuss specific training equipment.
  6. Don’t discuss people’s names and billets in conjunction with operations.
  7. Don’t speculate about current or future operations.
  8. Don’t spread rumors about current, future, or past operations or movements.
  9. Don’t assume the enemy is not trying to collect information on you; they are… right now.  Seriously.
  10. Be smart, use your head, and always think OPSEC when using email, phone, chat rooms and message boards.

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Operations Security: 1. A systematic, proven process by which a government, organization, or individual can identify, control, and protect generally unclassified information about an operation/activity and, thus, deny or mitigate an adversary’s/competitor’s ability to compromise or interrupt said operation/activity (NSC 1988). 2. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to (a) identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems, (b) determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation (DOD JP 1994; JCS 1997).

Operations Security process: An analytical process that involves five components: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, and application of appropriate countermeasures (NSC 1988).

Source: http://www.ioss.gov/glossary.html#o

Holiday Message

Happy Holidays from The Lint Center!
The Lint Center for National Security Studies would like to wish you a winter holiday filled with happiness, endearment, and prosperity. Your commitment, as well as that of the leadership team and all our volunteers, has helped foster the Lint Center’s mission to foster and further the educational development and opportunities for the next generation of America’s counterintelligence and national security workers.

The Lint Center for National Security Studies had a tremendous year in 2016 and we look forward to continued success in 2017. It is because of individuals like you, that the Lint Center continues to grow and succeed. During the holiday season, our thoughts turn gratefully to those who have made our success possible. It is in this spirit that we say thank you and best wishes for the holidays and New Year.

Battleground Berlin: The Second Berlin Crisis

By Andrew Ertl
Summer 2016 Jim & Anna Hyonjoo Lint Scholarship Winner
Third prize, 2016 Cold War Essay Contest, John Adams ’71 Center for Military History & Strategic Analysis at the Virginia Military Institute

Many will argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous event of the Cold War.  However, the 1962 events in Cuba would not have happened if not for those in Berlin in 1961 and thus, were only the second act of a two-part play, the origin of which was Berlin.  This was a performance in which the experienced Soviet Premier tested the young, newly elected American President, a pas de deux in which each expressed the willingness to go to the nuclear brink.  Both found themselves grappling for dominance in an increasingly bipolar world and were pushed in different directions by aids and allies alike.  More famously, the Second Berlin Crisis resulted in the erection and physical representation of the ‘Iron Curtain’: the Berlin Wall.

Following the conclusion of World War II in Europe, the Allies agreed to occupy and divide Germany as well as Berlin into four occupation zones (American, British, French, and Soviet).  The three capitalist zones were in the western two-thirds of occupied Germany and the Soviet one was in the eastern third.  Freedom of movement from the Western zones to and from Berlin and within Berlin itself was guaranteed.  These agreements were codified in the Potsdam Agreement on September 2, 1945.

Lying 110 miles inside the Soviet occupation zone, Berlin offered the Western Allies a potential base from which to undermine communism and advance capitalism. A prison state may have been forming, but in Berlin “there was a prison state with an open door.”[1] Nevertheless, the Soviet government did not consider the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement to be permanent.  Before a group of German communists, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin revealed his plan to undermine the position of the West and within a year or two they would have to withdraw.[2]

Before the hammer and sickle flew over the Reichstag, communist German exile Walter Ulbricht was inserted into Berlin by the Red Army with orders to begin slowly building socialism.  Because of his “unyielding, uncollaborative, Stalinist style of ruling,”[3] even German communists disliked him.  Ulbricht reminded them of another German leader, if not “as murderous or as belligerent as Hitler but certainly as brutal toward his own people.”[4]  In the Eastern zone, Communist red was replacing Nazi brown.

From the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949 to August 13, 1961, 2.8 million or 1/6 of the population fled,[5] the vast majority through West Berlin’s open door.[6]  Between September 1939 and May 1945, 1/12 of the German population died as a result of the Second World War.[7]  Proportionally then, the East German refugee crisis took away twice as much manpower from the GDR as Nazi Germany lost in World War II.  As one GDR Politburo member put it, the refugee crisis was “a critique with feet.”[8]

Amongst a plethora of ill-advised, socialist-inspired reforms, Ulbricht made heavy industry the backbone of the East German economy.  One repercussion of this decision was that in the ensuing refugee crisis, the GDR suffered more from a lack of manpower than an economy more focused on the production of consumer goods.  Allowed by Berlin’s special status, some 50,000 East Berliners (Grenzgägner) worked in capitalist West Berlin. [9]  The problem for the GDR wasn’t just that the Grenzgägner had better access to higher quality and more diversified consumer goods.  Nor was it that with their higher wages they were emptying out and thereby worsening an already bleak consumer market in the GDR.  Grenzgägner were a physical embodiment of the greater opportunities to be found outside socialism.  East Germans weren’t buying what Ulbricht was selling.

As early as 1952, Ulbricht had been seeking Soviet permission to end freedom of movement between the two Berlins in order to solve the refugee problem.[10]  Each time he was told that the better, more sustainable solution was to improve East German’s quality of life.  But that would have meant curtailing the size and scope of Ulbricht’s plans.  Due to the GDR’s position as the westernmost country of the Soviet bloc, he argued that it needed to be more faithful to the ideals of socialism.[11]

John Lewis Gaddis argues that during the Cold War, the superpowers “attached their own reputations to their respective clients…(and) fell into the habit of letting their German allies determine their German interests, and hence their German policies.”[12]  Despite his troublesome ally, the new Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev did have a card to play: West Berlin and Western access rights.  He intentionally raised tensions to change the political environment in order to rectify the West Berlin problem and in doing, he initiated the Second Berlin Crisis.

Before a group of Polish communists on November 10, 1958, Khrushchev declared:

The time has obviously arrived for the signatories of the Potsdam Agreement to give up the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin and thereby make it possible to create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic.[13]

The Western powers would have six months to negotiate a peace treaty with the GDR.  After six months, whether an agreement was reached or not, the USSR would then sign its own peace treaty with the GDR, granting full sovereign over East German territory—to include access rights into and out of Berlin unless superseded by any previous agreement the West might reach with the GDR—to East Germany.  West Berlin was to become a free city.  It truly was an ultimatum: why would the GDR reaffirm Western access rights it detested knowing it would soon be given sovereignty over them?  Khrushchev’s diktat was designed to get the Western powers out of West Berlin and was received rudely in the West.  US President Dwight Eisenhower didn’t even officially reply until March 1959 but by then the four powers had agreed to meet in Geneva to settle differences.  Khrushchev’s ultimatum had thus, passed without result.

To sooth tensions, Eisenhower invited Khrushchev to visit the United States from September 5-27 where he met everyone from politicians to entertainers.  Such was the spirit of the trip that Khrushchev invited Eisenhower and his family to tour the Soviet Union.  It was agreed that the four powers would meet again, this time in Paris the following May.  A surface-to-air missile, downed spy plane, and a captured American pilot changed that.

On May 1, 1960, American pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down while flying a reconnaissance mission over the USSR. On the first day of the Paris conference, Khrushchev warned Eisenhower, “Do not fly over the Soviet Union or the socialist countries.  If you don’t know where our borders are, we will show you.”[14]  He also demanded an apology.  While saying that the shoot down was an unfortunate incident and that he had already suspended all similar flights, Eisenhower would not apologize.  Khrushchev then withdrew from the conference.  He decided it would be better to wait to negotiate with the next American President[15] and Senator John F. Kennedy was leading in the polls.  But for Ulbricht and his fiefdom, “time was running out, along with the refugees.”[16]

On January 20, 1961, the youngest American President took the reins from the then oldest.  In his inaugural address, Kennedy declared the United States was prepared to:

Pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty….let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.[17]

His tough, but measured words were based on a misinterpretation of comments Khrushchev had made at a gathering of old communists on January 10.  Despite the rhetoric, Kennedy hinted at his desire for a meeting with Khrushchev and the Soviet Premier sent him a letter confirming their mutual desire.  Kennedy—thinking it imprudent to meet with Khrushchev before meeting with leaders of allied nations—made the mistake of waiting ten weeks to reply to Khrushchev. Khrushchev, a vain man—expected Kennedy to disregard the intricacies of diplomatic protocol—was insulted and now it was he who was slow to respond to Kennedy.

On April 17, Kennedy’s inexperience was highlighted further by the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.  Although the invasion plans began in the Eisenhower administration, Kennedy did not—at that time—show the backbone to cancel a plan he was uneasy about nor did he make the necessary changes to improve its success.  With disappointment, former Secretary of State and then Kennedy adviser Dean Acheson wrote “The European view was that they were watching a gifted young amateur practice with a boomerang, when they saw, to their horror, that he had knocked himself out.”[18]  Five days earlier, the USSR had received another international relations boon: Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man to orbit the Earth.  For Khrushchev—whose birthday was coincidentally April 17—the events of April 12 and 17 were like birthday presents.  Feeling the momentum of such events,[19] he was now willing to meet with Kennedy and Vienna would host.

Before the Vienna summit, each side was trying to mark its territory through diplomatic shadow boxing.  Khrushchev met with US Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson and tried to impress upon him that “Berlin was really of little importance to either America or the Soviet Union, so why should they get so worked up about changing the city’s status?”[20]  Khrushchev was trying out a similar line used by Stalin at Yalta.  And wasn’t it Lenin who said, ‘Whoever has Berlin has Germany?’

Meanwhile, Kennedy briefly consulted allied leaders in London and Paris on how best to deal with Khrushchev.  He shared with longtime aid Kenneth O’Donnell his views on Berlin:

You can’t blame Khrushchev for being sore about that…We didn’t cause the disunity in Germany.  We aren’t really responsible for the four-power occupation of Berlin, a mistake neither the Russians nor we should have agreed to in the first place.[21]

Kennedy was preparing to bend on US policy where every President before him stood firm.  In Paris, Kennedy asked French President Charles de Gaulle when and why he should use force over Berlin:

If Mr. Khrushchev signs a treaty with the GDR, this in itself is no reason for a military retaliation on our part.  If the GDR starts stamping travel documents, this is not, per se, a cause for military action either.  In what way, therefore, at what moment, shall we bring our pressure to bear?[22]

De Gaulle’s advice was to “make sure that Khrushchev believes you are a man who will fight.”[23]  Kennedy was prepared to be pragmatic while Khrushchev was planning to intimidate the “boy in short pants.”[24]  A British diplomat voiced the concern of many, “We hope the lad will be able to get out of the bear cage without being too badly mauled.”[25]

The first day of the summit was unproductive.  Kennedy attempted to explain how previous wars began over miscalculations at which point Khrushchev erupted and accused him of asking the Soviet Union “to sit like a schoolboy with his hands on his desk,”[26] charging that “the United States seems to regard Soviet defense of its vital interests as miscalculation.”[27]

Trying to find common ground, Kennedy stated “We regard the present balance of power between the Sino-Soviet forces and the forces of the United States and Western Europe as being more or less in balance.”[28]  After stroking the Soviet Premier’s ego, he then suggested the West should stay in its sphere of influence and that the Soviet Union do likewise so as to avoid upsetting the balance of power.[29] Having made recent gains in the Third World, Khrushchev was not interested in cutting the USSR off from part of its growing power base.

After further unproductive exchanges, the Soviet Premier took the initiative:

The USSR does not wish any change; it merely wants to formalize the situation which has resulted from World War II…East Germany is an ally of the socialist countries and this should be recognized as a fait accompli.  East Germany has new demarcation lines and these lines should become borders…The position of the GDR should be normalized and her sovereignty ensured.  To do all this it is necessary to eliminate the occupation rights in West Berlin.  No such rights should exist there.[30]

Not mentioning the word, Kennedy was trying to avoid any miscalculation with his response:

The signing of a peace treaty is not a belligerent act…However a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act.  The matter of a peace treaty with East Germany is a matter for Mr. Khrushchev’s judgment and is not a belligerent act.  What is a belligerent act is transfer of our rights to East Germany.[31]

Khrushchev gave a hypothetical example:

If you insisted on US rights after the signing of a peace treaty and if the borders of the GDR—land, air, or sea borders—were violated, they would be defended…Force would be met with force…If the US wanted war, that was its problem.[32]

Taken aback by Khrushchev’s intransigence and gritting his teeth, Kennedy replied, “It will be a cold winter.”[33]

One member of Kennedy’s entourage compared the mood on the flight back to the United States as “riding with the losing baseball team after the World Series.  Nobody said very much.”[34]  One American diplomat reasoned that the summit had been:

the golden opportunity for him to be charming, to have Jackie charm Khrushchev, and then have Kennedy come in and say, ‘Now look, I want to say this perfectly straight.  Get your bloody hands off Berlin or we’ll destroy you.’[35]

Kennedy later told New York Times writer James Reston that the Vienna summit had been the “roughest thing in my life” and that Khrushchev “just beat the hell out of me.”[36]  He reasoned, “The son of a bitch has got to see me move.”[37]

In East Germany, post-Vienna momentum was making a peace treaty between the USSR and GDR seem more likely.  On June 15, responding to a reporter’s question about where the boundaries in Berlin of a post-peace treaty GDR would be, Ulbricht answered oddly, “No one has the intention of building a wall.”[38]  That he would mention the word wall when the reporter did not ask about one implied that a wall was at least under consideration.  According to historian Hope Harrison, Ulbricht may have:

deliberately made the comments about the wall knowing that this would stimulate panic in the GDR and accelerate the exodus.  Khrushchev would then feel compelled to finally acquiesce in closing the border and signing a separate peace treaty.[39]

Torschlusspanik—the increasing anxiety of East Germans over the decision to leave now before it was too late—was rising.

In an Oval Office address on July 25, Kennedy stated the case for West Berlin:

West Berlin…is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a communist sea.  It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees.  West Berlin is all of that.  But above all it has now become—as never before—the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1946, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.  The United States is there; the United Kingdom and France are there; the pledge of NATO is there—and the people of Berlin are there.  It is as secure, in that sense, as the rest of us—for we cannot separate its safety from our own… And if there is one path above all others to war, it is the path of weakness and disunity.[40]

His words weren’t only meant to galvanize American public opinion though.  By mentioning ‘West Berlin’ 17 times, Kennedy was sending a message to Khrushchev: Do what you must in East Berlin in order to stabilize East Germany but don’t touch Western access rights or West Berlin.

This logic had support elsewhere.  On a Sunday television show July 30, Senator William Fulbright and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee offered his opinion:

The truth of the matter is, I think, the Russians have the power to close it in any case.  Next week, if they chose to close their borders, they could, without violating any treaty.  I don’t understand why the East Germans don’t close their border because I think they have a right to close it.[41]

Fulbright misspoke when he said a closure would have been legal.  But he, like Kennedy, was being pragmatic.  Even Khrushchev remarked, “Fulbright is a smart man, he does not want war.”[42]

As Kennedy saw it:

Khrushchev is losing East Germany.  He cannot let that happen.  If East Germany goes, so will Poland and all of Eastern Europe.  He will have to do something to stop the flow of refugees.  Perhaps a wall.  And we won’t be able to prevent it.  I can hold the Alliance together to defend West Berlin, but I cannot act to keep East Berlin open.[43]

We now know that the decision to erect the barrier that became the Berlin Wall was made in July.[44]  However, Ulbricht was told to wait but surreptitiously “prepare everything for a future contingency.”[45]  Ulbricht tasked GDR Party Security Secretary and his protégé, Eric Honecker with acquiring the necessary materials and organizing construction teams.  To avoid suspicion, the building materials were acquired using multiple East German purchasers who in turn ordered from multiple businesses; primarily in West Germany and the UK.  Lenin’s prediction that

‘The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them’ was coming true.

In the early morning hours of Sunday, August 13, East German police (Volkspolizei, Vopos) formed human chains, blocking all of the East-West Berlin crossing points.  Barbed wire and other entanglements were soon in place.  Freedom of movement inside Berlin ended for East Berliners.  US Chief of Mission of West Berlin, Allan Lightner Jr., cabled an understatement of understatements to Washington, “There seems to be something going on in East Berlin.”[46]  Despite diplomatic protests, the Western powers did nothing of any real significance.  A radio station in East Berlin repeated the joke, “Did you hear that [West Berlin Mayor] Brandt called the allies for help?  Yes, I heard, but the allies didn’t.”[47]

While he couldn’t express it in public, in private, President Kennedy was relieved:[48]

It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.  Why would Khrushchev put up a wall if he really intended to seize West Berlin?  There wouldn’t be any need of a wall if he occupied the whole city.  This is his way out of his predicament.[49]

In public, Kennedy needed to reassure the American people and more importantly, his allies.  He decided to send the hero of the Berlin Blockade—and registered Republican—Lucius Clay to Berlin as his personal representative on August 30.  Although Clay had no formal powers, he reported to no one other than the President.

Though the GDR stopped its refugee crisis, it still had another problem: it was unrecognized by most of the international community.  Volkspolizei began pulling over Western vehicles on the autobahn connecting West Germany to West Berlin demanding to see motorists’ identification.  Complying would lend—at least—a modicum of recognition to the East German state, thereby setting a legal precedent from which to build upon.  The standard operating procedure was, therefore to refuse and request to a Soviet official to intercede.  However, if stopped between West Germany and West Berlin, it often took quite some time before a Soviet official could arrive and thus, these stops were—aside from infringing on Western access rights—a considerable nuisance.  Amongst Clay’s first actions was to send US troops down the autobahn leading to and from West Berlin in random intervals to demonstrate an American presence while simultaneously asserting Western access rights.  If a Western vehicle stopped by Volkspolizei was spotted, the courtesy patrols—as they were known—would escort that vehicle to its intended destination.  Besides helping travelers, the courtesy patrols also served to maintain Western refusal to recognize the GDR.  One State Department cable read, “A problem that had vexed U.S. officials was settled by a simple action, and one can only wonder why it had not been taken before.”[50]

The Berlin Wall wasn’t really a wall on August 13, 1961. On August 17 though, brick and motor began replacing barbed wire section by section.  Walter Ulbricht declared that no one should approach within 100 meters on either side or they risked being shot.  He referred to these 100-meter exclusion zones as Todesstreifen (death strips).  Clay organized American soldiers who would drive along the western Todesstreifen in armored vehicles, again asserting Western rights and resolve.

The Soviets wanted predictable responses.  On August 9—four days before the border closure—a hero from the Battle of Berlin and recently retired Soviet Marshal, Ivan Konev was sent to East Berlin to ensure that nothing unpredictable occurred.  Clay’s modus operandi was to be unpredictable since he reasoned the Soviets would not allow the East Germans to risk an armed confrontation requiring Soviet assistance.  Such a confrontation would have revealed the GDR as a Soviet puppet state, not worthy of international recognition.  While Clay was becoming a local celebrity in West Berlin, in Washington his antics were unpopular, being deemed too provocative.  Following an incident in which he risked another provocation in a West Berlin suburb named Steinstücken, Clay cabled to Kennedy “I am not afraid of escalation.”[51]  Responding to criticism within the Kennedy administration—though not from the President himself—Clay argued “I can be of no real service if it is deemed wise to be extremely cautious in Berlin.”[52]  He offered to resign on October 18.

On October 22, Allan Lightner Jr. and his wife drove up to the Volkspolizei guard post at Checkpoint Charlie (the primary intra-Berlin checkpoint) and were promptly asked for identification.  Lightner refused and demanded to see a Soviet representative.  While waiting, he used his car phone to notify Lucius Clay of the situation.  After 45 minutes and no Soviet representative had appeared, Lightner apologized to the guards and drove off slowly towards East Berlin before being stopped a second time and surrounded by a larger group of Vopos.  By now, two squads of American soldiers were assembled at the American side of Checkpoint Charlie and marched to Lightner’s assistance.  Outgunned, the Vopos watched as Lightner and his escort went into East Berlin.  In order to drive home his point, Lightner went through Checkpoint Charlie two more times before a Soviet representative appeared.  The Soviet official apologized for the East German behavior but also criticized the American response.[53]  The following day, the GDR announced a new regulation whereby every person crossing into and departing East Berlin would have their identification checked except Western military personnel in uniform.

On October 25, Clay sent forward a probe of two American soldiers dressed in civilian clothes and as expected, they were stopped.  American diplomat Howard Trivers was on hand for such a situation and duly summoned a Soviet official.  This time, however, the Soviet official replied that the Americans must comply with GDR regulations.  Clay then ordered ten American tanks to park on the West Berlin side of Checkpoint Charlie while a squad of US soldiers escorted the car through.  The Soviet official looked at Trivers and said, “We have tanks too.”[54]

More than half of the US tanks were equipped with bulldozer blades.  Konev worried that if the Americans decided to knock down the wall, the East Germans might shoot.  He resolved to prevent this and assembled ten Soviet tanks on the East Berlin side of Checkpoint Charlie.  Before they arrived, the order was given for the Soviet tank men to cover their insignias with mud and dress in all black uniforms in order to conceal their identity, though it was hardly in doubt.  East German tanks (or troops of any kind) in East or West Berlin would have violated the Potsdam Agreement. The tanks were now facing one another only 100 meters apart.

A short time later, Kennedy telephoned Clay who reported to his boss:

Clay:        What we’ve done is prove that the Russians are still in charge.

Kennedy: Well, that’s all right.  Don’t lose your nerves.

Clay:        Mr. President, we’re not worried about losing our nerves over here.  What we’re worried about is whether people in Washington are losing theirs.

Kennedy: [Possibly with Clay’s resignation letter in mind—Kennedy had not responded] I’ve got a lot of people here that have, but I haven’t.[55]

After sixteen hours, the Soviet tanks were ordered to pull back.  Shortly thereafter, the Americans matched their Soviet counterparts.  The ‘meeting of the tanks’ was the only time in the Cold War in which American and Soviet armor confronted one another at point-blank range.

We now know that the Soviets were extremely worried by Ulbricht’s escalatory measures and the American responses to those measures.  Khrushchev ordered Konev, who was—although unknown publicly—in charge of all Soviet and East German forces in Berlin, “Not one shot without permission from Moscow.”[56]  The whole purpose of Ulbricht’s escalation was to achieve international recognition for the GDR.  That the Soviets intervened showed that they didn’t fully trust the decision-making apparatus of their East German ally.  Ulbricht’s plans for international recognition would be set back by a decade.

At the heart of the ‘German Question’ was Berlin; a city that during the Cold War became a physical and psychological frontline between two ideologically opposed superpowers.  While the actions taken by the GDR on August 13, 1961 were illegal, it was an illegality that the West could live with; European stability was the common ground upon which Kennedy and Khrushchev stood.  The Berlin Wall ended the East German refugee crisis but, to paraphrase Khrushchev, the game continued.[57]  On September 3, 1971 the four Allied powers signed the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.  That agreement paved the way for the bilateral Basic Treaty, signed between West and East Germany on December 21, 1972 which allowed for mutual diplomatic recognition of one another and by extension, the rest of the world.  When asked when the wall might be removed, Khrushchev told West German Ambassador to the USSR Hans Kroll, “The wall will disappear again someday, but only when the reasons for its construction disappear.”[58]  No one knew it at the time, but after the signing of the Basic Treaty, the Berlin Wall only had 17 more years to live.  But that is another story.

 

Works Cited

Békés, Csaba.  Conversation.  3 October 2015.

Brinkley, Douglas. Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years 1953-1971. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1994.

“For West Berlin, lying exposed”: JFKL, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, President Kennedy, The White House. July 25, 1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03BerlinCrisis07251961.htm.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959-1963. vol. XIV. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. 1991.

Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1997.

Harrison, Hope. Driving the Soviets Up the Wall. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2003.

Kempe, Frederick. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. New York: Berkley Books. 2011.

Miller, Roger. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 2008.

“News Conference Remarks by Chairman Ulbricht Spelling Out the Consequences of Creating a ‘Free City’ of West Berlin, 15 June 1961.” Documents on Germany, 1944-1985. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. 1985.

‪“Notes of a Conference among Marshal Zhukov, General Clay, and General Weeks on Surface and Air Access to Berlin.” 29 June 1945.

“N. S. Khurshchev’s Speech at the Soviet-Polish Friendship Meeting (November 10, 1958).” Embree, ed., The Soviet Union and the German Question.

O’Donnell, Kenneth, Powers, David, and Joe McCarthy. Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye: Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy. New York: Little Brown & Co. 1972.

Smyser, W. R. Kennedy and the Berlin Wall. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2010.

Sokolowski, John A., and Catherine M. Burns. Modeling and Simulations for Analyzing Global Events. Hoboken: Wiley. 2009.

Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1994.

Those who had worked: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Interview with Kempton B. Jenkins, Foreign Affairs OH. Interview conducted February 23, 1995 (copyright 1998 ADST). Box: 1 Fold: 34 Jenkins, Kempton B. (1951-1980). http://www.library.georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/cl999.htm.

Wirtschaft und Statistik October 1956, Journal published by Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. (German government Statistical Office).

 

Footnotes

[1] Csaba Békés.  Conversation.  3 October 2015.

[2] Roger Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 13.

[3] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 23.

[4] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 40.

[5] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), XIX.

[6] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 99.

[7] Wirtschaft und Statistik October 1956, Journal published by Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. (German government Statistical Office).

[8] Ibid., 73.

[9] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 100.

[10] Ibid., 169.

[11] Ibid., 76.

[12] John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 150.

[13] “N. S. Khurshchev’s Speech at the Soviet-Polish Friendship Meeting (November 10, 1958),” in Embree, ed., The Soviet Union and the German Question, 18.

[14] John A. Sokolowski and Catherine M. Burns, Modeling and Simulations for Analyzing Global Events (Hoboken: Wiley, 2009), 182.

[15] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 21.

[16] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 172.

[17] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 23.

[18] Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years 1953-1971 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 127.

[19] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 167.

[20] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 201.

[21] Kenneth O’Donnell, David Powers, and Joe McCarthy, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye: Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (New York: Little Brown & Co., 1972), 299-300.

[22] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 175.

[23] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 62.

[24] William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 485.

[25] Kenneth O’Donnell, David Powers, and Joe McCarthy, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye: Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (New York: Little Brown & Co., 1972), 294.

[26] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 65.

[27] Ibid., 66.

[28] Ibid., 66.

[29] Ibid., 67.

[30] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 176.

[31] Ibid.,177.

[32] Ibid., 177.

[33] Ibid., 177.

[34] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 258.

[35] Those who had worked: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Interview with Kempton B. Jenkins, Foreign Affairs OH. Interview conducted February 23, 1995 (copyright 1998 ADST), Box: 1 Fold: 34 Jenkins, Kempton B. (1951-1980): http://www.library.georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/cl999.htm.

[36] William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 495.

[37] Ibid., 766.

[38] “News Conference Remarks by Chairman Ulbricht Spelling Out the Consequences of Creating a ‘Free City’ of West Berlin, 15 June 1961,” Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985, 737.

[39] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 180.

[40] “For West Berlin, lying exposed”: JFKL, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, President Kennedy, The White House, July 25, 1961: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03BerlinCrisis07251961.htm.

[41] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 315-16.

[42] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 192.

[43] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 294.

[44] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 186.

[45] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 55.

[46] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 351.

[47] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 113.

[48] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 383.

[49] Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 207.

[50] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 132.

[51] Ibid., 131.

[52] Ibid., 133.

[53] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959-1963, vol. XIV, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1991, 524.

[54] Ibid., 524.

[55] W. R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 2010), 140.

[56] Ibid., 99.

[57] Ibid., 165.

[58] Frederick Kempe, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley Books, 2011), 294.

Lint Center Proudly Announces the Appointment of Mr. Timothy Coleman to Vice President

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, a non-profit organization focused on supporting the next generation of America’s National Security professionals through scholarship and mentoring opportunities, is pleased to announce the appointment of Mr. Timothy Coleman to Vice President.

Mr. Coleman was one of the first scholarship recipients from the Lint Center for National Security Studies, awarded the Aehee Kim Alliance Building Award in 2008. Completing an exceptionally successful Lint Center mentorship, Tim requested to continue to serve as a volunteer to give back to those who would go on to champion the Center’s mission. Tim is known for his tireless efforts supporting the Center which have propelled him to progress through a multitude of roles of increasing responsibility. In recognition of Tim’s volunteer work he has received two Presidential Volunteer Service Awards during his tenure. Since 2008 Tim has served as the Lint Center Public Affairs Officer, Director of Communications, and Chief Operating Officer. We are pleased to announce his promotion to Vice President. Tim was the first volunteer to be invited by the Center to become a formal member of the Board of Directors. Tim will continue to provide strategic counsel as a standing member of the Board of Directors.

Tim completed his B.A. from Georgetown University, an M.B.A. in Finance from the Andreas School of Business at Barry University, a Graduate Studies Program Certificate from Singularity University at NASA Ames Research Park in Silicon Valley, and a Master’s of Public and International Affairs with a major in Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. While at the University of Pittsburgh, Tim was also a Research Associate at the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, his research focused on technology adoption strategies by violent non-state actors and terrorist groups.

Tim began on Capitol Hill, worked on a successful U.S. Senate campaign and then joined a full-service, technology marketing communications firm. He was an intelligence analyst for a DC-based service which provided global intelligence and forecasting from former CIA, U.S. intelligence and national security officers. He also co-founded two security-focused technology startup firms, one of which was selected as Entrepreneur Magazine’s “100 Most Brilliant Companies,” and his firm was nominated for the “Cool Vendor of the Year” Award by Gartner Research.  Tim is a Washington, DC-based defense contractor and serves as the Executive Editor of Homeland Security Today Magazine. His writing has appeared in numerous notable publications.

In an earlier statement regarding Mr. Coleman, Mr. James Lint, President and CEO of the Lint Center for National Security Studies commented, “I understand the importance of recruiting and mentoring the best possible emerging leaders to handle future issues of consequence, and I stand by that statement today. Mr. Coleman has been affiliated with the Lint Center for eight years where he began as a Public Relations Coordinator. He was eager, sharp and a great asset; a jack-of-all-trades within a young, but growing organization with limited funds. Mr. Coleman’s ability to move from Public Relations Coordinator to Vice President demonstrates his potential, and the potential of Lint Center Volunteers.”

“We have supported a tremendous amount of people who are diligently working, sacrificing, and defending this nation,” said Tim Coleman, Vice President Lint Center for National Security Studies.  “There is much to be said of young, emerging leaders who chose valor, honor, and national purpose above a multitude of alternate ambitious motivational professional drivers.”

Tim continued, “I am pleased to be a part of the Lint Center, gratified to be a part of its leadership team, and honored to continue supporting those who wish to follow in the footsteps of national service. I am most proud of our scholarship winners; they deserve the credit and recognition. They and our dedicated team of volunteers are the ones making the difference day-in-and-day-out.”

Lint added, “We always try to help our volunteers build their future. Mr. Coleman personifies the professional growth opportunities open to all Lint Center Volunteers. Volunteers have a chance for promotion and to climb the ladder of success in a charity. This can be a great benefit for building resumes and getting experience at a higher level leading to jobs with more responsibility in the future. We encourage our volunteers to enjoy the charity experience, learn and have fun!”

About the Lint Center:

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, Inc., founded in 2007, is a non-profit IRS 501 (c) (3) organization awards award merit-based scholarships and mentoring programs for students pursuing careers in national service with a particular focus on counterintelligence, military intelligence, national security and cross-cultural studies. The Center is Veteran and minority operated and managed. It awards scholarships semi-annually in both January and July. For more information, please visit http://www.lintcenter.org/.

Lint Center and IAFIE Award $1000 Scholarship to Aspiring Intelligence Professional

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, a non-profit dedicated to fostering the educational development of the next generation of America’s Counterintelligence and National Security professionals, and the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), the leading international organization for Intelligence Education, today announced the Summer 2016 International Association for Intelligence Education Scholarship award winner.

The winner, who for security purposes is known only as “WGBIII,” has been awarded a $1,000 scholarship to continue his pursuit of a career in intelligence and national Security. WGBIII was awarded the scholarship based on his embodiment of the principles forwarded by the Lint Center and IAFIE.

“IAFIE is delighted to announce the winner of the Summer 2016 International Association for Intelligence Education Scholarship,” said Dr. Larry Valero, President of IAFIE. “WGBIII exemplifies the type of promising individuals we aim to assist through our scholarship initiatives—passion, desire to serve, strong moral fiber and dedication to improving national security.”

WGBIII is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Criminal Justice at Angelo State University (ASU). He holds a Master of Securities Studies, Intelligence and Analysis from ASU and a Bachelor of Business Administration from Thomas Edison State College. He plans to pursue a PhD and teach Security Studies and Intelligence at the conclusion of his intelligence career.

WGBIII has interned with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Law Enforcement Center and Georgetown University Law Criminal Justice Center. He also participated in the U.S. Naval Cadet Corps program where he developed a deep appreciation for American founding principles and military history.

“I am very grateful to both IAFIE and the Lint Center for the scholarship,” WGBIII said. “As a young professional, it means so much to be honored with this award. The scholarship will help defray the financial costs of my educational pathway and I am excited to have the privilege of learning from seasoned veterans in the field through the mentorship program.”

The Summer 2016 International Association for Intelligence Education Scholarship was established by the Lint Center to assist talented individuals desiring to make a career in the intelligence field. The scholarship forwards the Lint Center’s shared mission with IAFIE of empowering and supporting emerging national security leaders.

“WGBIII is the first individual to receive the International Association for Intelligence Education Scholarship,” said James R. Lint, CEO at the Lint Center. “The Lint Center and IAFIE have been at the forefront of supporting vitally important careers in intelligence through education and scholarship opportunities. WGBIII clearly demonstrates the core qualities essential in the next generation of emerging leaders which the Lint Center aims to empower through this scholarship.”

About the Lint Center:

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, Inc., founded in 2007, is a non-profit IRS 501 (c) (3) organization awards award merit-based scholarships and mentoring programs for students pursuing careers in national service with a particular focus on counterintelligence, military intelligence, national security and cross-cultural studies. The Center is Veteran and minority operated and managed. It awards scholarships semi-annually in both January and July. For more information, please visit http://www.lintcenter.org/.

About the International Association for Intelligence Education:

The International Associated for Intelligence Education is the leading international organization for Intelligence Education. The Association was formed in June 2004 as a result of a gathering of sixty plus intelligence studies trainers and educators at the Sixth Annual International Colloquium on Intelligence at Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania. The mission of the Association is to advance research, knowledge and professional development in intelligence education. For more information, please visit www.iafie.org.

Lint Center Announces the Appointment of Ryan Sofranko as Chief Operations Officer

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, a non-profit organization focused on supporting the next generation of America’s National Security professionals through scholarship and mentoring opportunities, today is pleased to announce the appointment of Ryan Sofranko to Chief Operations Officer.

Mr. Sofranko first joined the Lint Center as a marketing coordinator in July 2014. Since that time, he has taken on numerous key roles and positions, having previously acted as Operations Coordinator and Operations Manager. Mr. Sofranko exemplified his dedication to the Lint Center’s operations and the key abilities of problem-solving, operations research, and verbal communication that makes a both a volunteer and a manager successful. He has proved to be an indispensable member of the Lint Center’s team, responsible for managing and standardizing day-to-day operations, overseeing the selection and coordination process of new volunteers, and serving as lead project manager for a majority of Lint Center operations. In recognition of his dedication and professionalism to the Lint Center mission, he was awarded a Bronze Presidential Volunteer Service Award in 2015. Sofranko will continue to manage the day-to-day operations with our non-paid all volunteer staff.

“We are delighted to recognize the hard work and dedicated efforts of key members of our volunteer team,” said Mr. James R. Lint, Chairman of the Lint Center for National Security Studies. “Ryan has made a tremendous impact on our mission and his professionalism exceptional. We are extremely pleased to further integrate him into the leadership team at the center and look forward to having him continue to propel the center’s success in the years to come.”

“We must never take our security for granted,” said Ryan Sofranko, Chief Operations Officer for the Lint Center for National Security Studies. “One of the many reasons I decided to volunteer with the Lint Center was because of the clear commitment to empower those who have dedicated their lives to the security of our nation. National security is a generational effort and we must work diligently to continue that tradition.”

“I am tremendously proud of all our scholarship winners, each of whom has an inspiring story and history of accomplishments. Mr. Sofranko continued, “Lastly, I would like to recognize the hard work and dedication displayed by our all-volunteer staff. We would not be able to accomplish our mission without every one you. It is an honor to work alongside of you each and every day.”

Mr. Sofranko completed his B.S. in Information Systems Security from American Military University and will graduate with an M.S. in Data Analytics from Southern New Hampshire University in January 2017. While at Southern New Hampshire University, Sofranko was awarded the university’s Veteran Scholarship in recognition for his academic achievement in his graduate program.

Mr. Sofranko has nine years of active duty service in the United States Air Force where he currently serves in the Airfield Management career field. He has held assignments in Mississippi, Virginia, Korea, and Hawaii and has deployed to the Middle East. Currently, Mr. Sofranko is assigned to Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces where he coordinates the joint use of international airspace with host nation partners. Recognizing his exceptional performance, U.S. Air Force Gen. Lori J. Robinson, the former Pacific Air Forces commander, presented Sofranko with a unique promotion through the Stripes for Exceptional Performers program in January 2016. His personal decorations and accommodations include two Air Force Commendation Medals, three Air Force Achievement Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and Korean Defense Service Medal.

This press release was prepared by Lint Center volunteer, Lael Hardtman.

About the Lint Center:

The Lint Center for National Security Studies, Inc., founded in 2007, is a non-profit IRS 501 (c) (3) organization awards award merit-based scholarships and mentoring programs for students pursuing careers in national service with a particular focus on counterintelligence, military intelligence, national security and cross-cultural studies. The Center is Veteran and minority operated and managed. It awards scholarships semi-annually in both January and July. For more information, please visit http://www.lintcenter.org/.